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I. GAMBLING IN THE WAKE OF SEMINOLE
The Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. lorida comes at a
critical moment not only in the controversy over states' rights,2 but also in the
regulation of Indian gaming. Gambling in the United States has increased
dramatically in recent years. 3 Indian reservations account for much of this
growth: at this writing, over 170 Indian casinos and bingo halls4 gross
approximately $5 billion per year.5 The regulation of Indian gaming thus
inevitably implicates issues transcending reservations' boundaries, and,
conversely, the looser regulation of other forms of gambling may well threaten
the continued viability of Indian gaming. The federal government, which has
plenary power to regulate relations with the Indian tribes under the Constitu-
tion,6 sees the growth of gambling on Indian lands7 as "a means of promoting
tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal govern-
ments." 8 State governments, by contrast, have often opposed the expansion of
Indian gaming because of public policy concerns about gambling per se and
because Indian casinos compete with non-Indian gaming operations that
constitute a significant source of state revenues. 9 The differing agendas of the
1. No. 94-12, 1996 WL 134309 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1996).
2. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Curb Federal Power to Subject States to Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at Al; Nina Bernstein, An Accountability Issue:As States Gain Political Power,
a Ruling Seems to Free Them of Some Legal Reins, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1996, at Al. For the range
of preliminary reactions to the Supreme Court's decision, compare Lurching Toward States' Rights,
N.Y. TIMES. Mar. 29, 1996, at A20, with A Return to Conservative Activism, ST. LOUiS POST-
DISPATCH, Mar. 29, 1996, at 16C.
3. Americans gamble over $300 billion yearly, and the amount is increasing rapidly. David
Holmstrom, U.S. Gambling as Never Before, CHRISTIAN Sc. MONITOR, Jan. 26, 1993, at 8; Steve
Kerch, Gambling Industry Placing Its Bets On Erplosive Growth, CHI. TRaB., Nov. 8, 1992, at Cl.
4. Francis X. Clines, The Pequots, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 49.
5. David Holmstrom, Indian Gaming Booms Nationwide, CHRISTIAN SCt. MONITOR, Nov. 10,
1992, at 6.
6. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce... with the Indian tribes...."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This clause, part of the better-known Interstate Commerce Clause, is
sometimes known as the "Indian Commerce Clause."
7. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA) defines "Indian lands" as
all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and.., any land title to which is either
held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by
any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States against alienation and
over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.
25 U.S.C.A. § 2703(4) (Supp. 1995).
8. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (Supp. 1995).
9. See, e.g., Gary Sokolow, The Future of Gambling in Indian Country, 15 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
151, 166-67 (1990) (discussing competing state and tribal interests).
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federal and state governments have raised fundamental questions of federalism.
This conflict has led to inconsistency and controversy in the enforcement of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA), 10 ironically passed by
Congress to resolve similar federal-state constitutional disputes." Although
the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole resolves some of the uncertainty
surrounding the IGRA, it may have raised more questions than it answered.
A. The Regulation of Indian Gaming
Congress intended the IGRA to be both a boon to state governments and
an acknowledgment of tribal sovereignty. 2 When the IGRA was enacted, the
power of states to intervene in the affairs of Indian tribes 3 had been dramati-
cally curtailed by the United States Supreme Court. In California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians,14 the Court prevented state governments from
regulating or prohibiting gambling on Indian lands, as long as the state had no
absolute prohibition on gambling. 5 The Court ruled that the federal govern-
ment, particularly the Department of the Interior, had the "primary responsibil-
ity" for the regulation of gambling on Indian lands. 6 Congress passed the
10. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-21 (Supp. 1995) and 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1166-68 (1988 & Supp. 1995). The
IGRA establishes a National Indian Gaming Commission within the Department of the Interior to
oversee tribal gaming, which is divided into three categories. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2703(6)-(8). "Class I
gaming" includes social games and traditional Indian wagering ceremonies and celebrations, id.
§ 2703(6), and is to be regulated exclusively by the Indian tribal governments. Id. § 2710(a)(4). "Class
I gaming" includes mainly bingo-like games, which are within tribal jurisdiction, id. § 2703(7)(A), but
only allowed if the state already allows similar games. Id. § 2710(b)(1). "Class MI gaming," the center
of most of the controversy, includes casino-type table games, slot machines, "lotteries," and parimutuel
wagering, see id. § 2703(8), which are only allowed if the state "permits such gaming for any purpose
by any person, organization, or entity," pursuant to a "Tribal-State compact" governing the conduct,
regulation, and policing of such activity. Id. § 2710(d)(1). For further definition of terms and policies
under the IGRA, see the regulations promulgated by the National Indian Gaming Commission, 25
C.F.R. § 502 (1995). See also S. REP. No. 100-446, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071 (legislative history of the IGRA).
11. For an extended discussion of the inconsistency in application of the IGRA, see Marc S.
Feinstein, Case Note, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, Indian Gaming, and the State's
Eleventh Amendment Immunity: Where Will the Conflict in the Circuits Fuse?, 39 S.D. L. REV. 604
(1994) (comparing different circuit courts' interpretations of the IGRA).
12. See, e.g., Sokolow, supra note 9, at 164 (federal attempt to compromise Indian sovereignty);
Sean Brewer, Note, Analysis ofthe Indian Gaming Regulatory Act inLight of Current Tenth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 469, 470 (1995) (Congress's attempt to balance state and Indian
interests).
13. The IGRA defines "Indian tribes" as "any Indian ... organized group or community of Indians
which.., is recognized by the Secretary [of the Interior]... [and] is recognized as possessing powers
of self-government." 25 U.S.C.A. § 2703(5) (Supp. 1995).
14. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
15. Id. at 221.
16. Id. at 216-17. The holding in Cabazon undermined several assumptions about the states'
regulation of gambling within their borders. For example, the Court stated, "[Tjhat an otherwise
regulatory law is enforceable by criminal as well as civil means does not necessarily convert it into a
criminal law. .. ." Id. at 211. Thus the Court held that California could not enforce a criminal law
against commercial (i.e., high stakes or non-charitable) gambling within Indian lands because federal
law denied the state general civil regulatory authority over Indian tribes. In determining the applicability
of state laws to Indian jurisdictions under Pub. L. 280, the courts determined whether relevant state law
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IGRA to restore some measure of state control over such gambling. The Act
explicitly delegates 7 to the states some of the federal government's sover-
eignty over Indian gambling. The IGRA requires state governments to engage
in "good faith negotiations"" toward "Tribal-State compacts" with tribes
seeking to open casinos.19 A critical provision of the IGRA allowed an Indian
tribe to sue a state in federal court if the state failed to negotiate in good
faith.
Seminole struck down, as a violation of the Eleventh Amendment, 21 this
key enforcement apparatus.' The Court thus overruled its holding in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas,' a plurality opinion which upheld Congress's
power to abrogate states' sovereign immunity from suit pursuant to its plenary
power under the Interstate Commerce Clause.' The Court further ruled that
tribes could not avoid the Eleventh Amendment bar by suing individual state
officials in federal court in order to enforce the IGRA.15
Although the Court invalidated only the enforcement provisions of the
IGRA, it is unclear what force the remaining provisions have in the absence of
an enforcement mechanism. The IGRA includes a severability clause,' but
fails to provide explicitly for a finding that the courts could not constitutionally
entertain jurisdiction. The Court specifically excluded the possibility that the
and policy were "criminal-prohibitory" or "civil-regulatory" in nature. The latter could not be enforced
on Indian lands. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), and
Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983)). This language was later included in the IGRA itself. 25 U.S.C.A.
§ 2701(5) (Supp. 1995).
17. The IGRA did not conflict with Cabazon, which held only that states could not regulate Indian
gambling in the absence of a federal statute delegating this power to the states. 480 U.S. at 207.
18. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) (Supp. 1995). For an extended discussion of the possible
interpretations of the "good faith" standard, see Nancy McKay, Comment, The Meaning of GoodFaith
in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 27 GoNZ. L. REv. 471 (1992).
19. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(3)(C) (Supp. 1995). For a critique of the conception of Tribal-State
compacts, see, e.g., Eric D. Jones, Note, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: A Forum for Conflict
Among the Plenary Power of Congress, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Eleventh Amendment, 18 VT. L.
REV. 127, 132-33 (1993).
20. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(7)(A) (Supp. 1995).
21. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
22. Seminole, 1996 WL 134309 at *3 ("We hold that notwithstanding Congress' clear intent to
abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Congress that
power, and therefore § 2710(d)(7) cannot grant jurisdiction over a State that does not consent to be
sued.").
23. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
24. 491 U.S. at 19-20.
25. 1996 WL 134309 at *16-*17. The Court's decision in this regard is a matter of statutory rather
than constitutional construction. Indeed, the decision suggests that were the IGRA drafted differently,
a suit might be possible under the doctrine of Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (allowing federal
jurisdiction over suit against state official seeking only prospective injunctive relief). Seminole, at *17
n. 17 ("'W]e do not hold that Congress cannot authorize federal jurisdiction under Exparte Young over
a cause of action with a limited remedial scheme.").
26. 25 U.S.C. § 2721 (1995).
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judiciary would construct an enforcement regime to ensure good-faith
negotiation.27
One possible outcome of Seminole is that the Secretary of the Interior might
seek to authorize tribal casinos directly in the absence of good-faith negotiation
by states. Justice Stevens, uncontroverted by the majority, claims in dissent that
this may be permissible,a citing the disposition of the Eleventh Circuit below.
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the IGRA allows the Secretary such direct
authority when the state refuses to negotiate with a tribe.29 This reasoning
seems flawed, however, since the IGRA provides the Secretary this authority
only when the state refuses to accept a compact selected by a mediator after a
federal district court's ruling that the state had refused to negotiate in good
faith.30 Of course, the Department of the Interior might argue that Congress
intended to allow Indian tribes to open casinos3 and that courts should read
into the IGRA permission for the Secretary to issue regulations to that effect.
In any case, direct federal intervention based on the remaining provisions of
the IGRA would likely spur states to file further legal challenges.
Florida may have pursued its Eleventh Amendment claim partly because of
concerns about state sovereignty generally, but the specter of rampant casino
gambling surely contributed to the state's resistance to the IGRAs enforcement
provision. 2 Although the IGRA was a compromise among state, tribal, and
federal concerns, it did not eliminate the tension between states' interest in
preserving control over intrastate public policy issues and the federal interest
in the independence and economic self-sufficiency of Indian tribes. 33 The
27. 1996 WL 134309 at *17 ("Nor are we free to rewrite the statutory scheme in order to
approximate what we think Congress might have wanted had it known that § 2710(d)(7) was beyond its
authority. If that effort is to be made, it should be made by Congress, and not by the federal courts.").
28. Seminole, 1996 WL 134309, *18, *28.
29. See Florida v. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d 1016, 1029 (11th Cir. 1994) ("If the state pleads an
Eleventh Amendment defense, the suit is dismissed, and the tribe, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(7)(B)(vii), then may notify the Secretary of the Interior of the tribe's failure to negotiate a
compact with the state. The Secretary then may prescribe regulations governing class ImI gaming on the
tribe's lands.").
30. Because the federal court appoints the mediator, there will be no compact for the state to refuse
in the absence of federal court jurisdiction. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv) (providing for
appointment of a mediator). Moreover, the IGRA requires that the procedures prescribed by the
Secretary be "consistent with the proposed compact selected by the mediator." 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(7)(B)(vii)(ID.
31. Congress clearly intended to give the Indian tribes ultimate authority to regulate gaming activity
on their lands. The congressional findings note that "Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate
gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and
is conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such
gaming activity." 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5).
32. Indeed, Florida reaction to the Seminole decision focused on the gambling controversy rather
than on state sovereignty issues. See, e.g., Cheer Court Ruling Over Casinos, BeAlert to AnotherLegal
Loophole, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 31, 1996, at4G ("The majority of Floridians-
who three times have overwhelmingly voted down legalizing casinos-are entitled to sigh with relief and
even cheer the news.").
33. See supra text accompanying note 5.
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IGRA essentially forced states to "negotiate" issues of regulation, policing, and
infrastructure for gambling facilities they may not have wanted at all. There
were two ways in which this encroachment upon state sovereignty limited state
governments' ability to shape policies that preserve their fiscal and public-
public interests.
First, states have their own vested economic interests in taxing non-Indian
gaming, which can be a significant source of revenue. 4 States are not likely
to favor Indian gaming, which they cannot tax," when it is likely to compete
with gambling enterprises on non-Indian land.36 The IGRA acknowledges
states' revenue needs by providing that states and tribes must consider
"adverse economic impact on existing gaming activities" in negotiating a
compact,37 but this provision does not indicate how much weight to accord such
impact.
Second, the IGRA amounted to a de facto endorsement of high-stakes
gambling on Indian reservations. Although the Act bans high-stakes gambling
on reservations in states that prohibit such gambling as a matter of public
policy, courts interpreting the Act generally allowed any type of high-stakes
gaming on Indian reservations if a state allows some type of casino-style
gaming. 8 Courts effectively refused to recognize a public policy distinction
between allowing "Las Vegas Nights" as charity fundraisers and condoning
hard-core casino gambling. 9 This left state governments with two choices:
either to prohibit gambling (including lotteries, church bingo, and parimutuel
betting like horse races and jai-alai) entirely or to legalize it further in hope of
raising revenues.' Indeed, the economic competition between states' revenue
considerations and Indian casinos often pushes states toward looser regulation
34. See ROBERT GOODMAN, THE LUCK BuSINESS 111-18 (1995).
35. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (holding that states may not tax Indians
on reservation without congressional authorization).
36. "The states resented the federal government not only for giving the tribes a nontaxable
opportunity to compete with their existing gambling ventures like state lotteries and racetracks, but also
for allowing them to operate commercial gambling enterprises that weren't generally permitted in a
state." GOODMAN, supra note 19, at 113.
37. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)(1) (Supp. 1995).
38. In accordance with the holding in Cabazon, "if a state allows charity 'Las Vegas' nights with
low-stakes roulette or blackjack, a tribe can include high-stakes roulette or blackjack in its reservation
casino." GOODMAN, supra note 19, at 116.
39. As Justice Stevens wrote in Cabazon, "I find this approach to 'public policy' curious, to say
the least. .. . To argue that the tribal [high-stakes] bingo games comply with the public policy of
California because the State permits some other gambling is tantamount to arguing that driving over 60
miles an hour is consistent with public policy because the State allows driving at speeds up to 55 miles
an hour." 480 U.S. at 224-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. "Since tribes can claim the right to use [electronic gambling] machines once a state allows
them, there is often some pressure against legalization. On the other hand, in states where tribal casinos
already have slot machines, there are powerful incentives for politicians to legalize them, in order to
compete with the Indian gambling ventures." GOODMAN, supra note 19, at 129. As Goodman points
out, tribes in such states as Minnesota and Connecticut have agreed to state-demanded concessions in
return for monopolies on statewide gambling, which in turn has curtailed intrastate expansion of
gambling in those states. Id. at 114; see infra text accompanying notes 59-62.
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of off-reservation gambling. After New York negotiated a tribal gaming
compact, a state senator said that unless the state legalized non-Indian casinos,
it would "be giving great benefits to Indians while our tourism industry is
dying and people are out of work."
41
Even before Seminole, some members of Congress, concerned that the
states are thwarting a law that was intended to increase their authority,
reconsidered the wisdom of the IGRA compromise. In a letter to the chair of
the National Governors' Association, the chair of the Select Committee on
Indian Affairs wrote,
If, by asserting the Eleventh Amendment, the states are indicating that they wish
to have no role to play in the regulation of Indian gaming operations, it would seem
that we are left with the alternative of having the federal government negotiate
compacts with the tribal governments for the conduct of Class ImI gaming, and of
comprehensive federal regulation of Indian gaming.42
The Seminole decision makes the possibility of direct federal regulation more
immediate. Although the Supreme Court may have an opportunity to clarify the
permissibility of such regulation in a pending case,43 resolution of the Indian
gaming regulatory scheme may ultimately require Congressional action.
B. The Regulation of Non-Indian Gaming
The destiny of Indian gaming is intertwined with the fate of its non-Indian
counterparts for two reasons. First, an increase in non-Indian gaming could
jeopardize the Indian gaming boom. Second, because gambling often
substantially affects interstate commerce, non-Indian gaming, like Indian
gaming, involves considerations of the appropriate balance between federal and
state regulatory powers. Any IGRA reform could be part of a general overhaul
of the federal regulatory scheme for gambling. Discussion of gambling policy
on Indian lands must therefore consider policy developments in general
41. James Dao, Cuomo Signs Pact With Indians for Casino in UpstateNew York, N.Y. TmEs, Apr.
17, 1993, at 1.
42. Letter from Senator Daniel K. Inouye to Governor John Ashcroft (June 16, 1992) (quoted in
Roland J. Santoum, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: How Did We Get Here? WhereAre We Going?,
26 CREiGHTON L. REv. 387, 446-47 (1993)).
43. Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994), petitionfor cert.filed, 63 U.S.L.W.
3477 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1994). The result in Seminole appears to mandate the reversal of the Tenth Circuit's
decision holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not grant Oklahoma immunity from an IGRA suit.
While the Court might simply remand the case to the Tenth Circuit for proceedings consistent with
Seminole, it could also use this case as a vehicle to remove lingering confusion created by the Seminole
decision. In Ponca, the states raised a further Tenth Amendment challenge to the IGRA, on the grounds
that the IGRA impermissibly usurps the states' regulatory and legislative apparatus. Id. at 1432-36; cf .
New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2420 (1992) (holding that Congress may not
"commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce
a federal regulatory program."). The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, which, if accepted by the
Supreme Court, could invalidate the entire IGRA.
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gambling regulation.
State and federal regulation of non-Indian gambling determines the
competition that tribal casinos face." Congress has not extended its regulatory
power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to establish a uniform policy
toward non-Indian gaming. However, Congress has enacted a number of
statutes that buffer the policies of those states that restrict gambling. Several
statutes federalize crimes related to gambling.45 Federal law also regulates the
manufacture of gambling devices and prohibits the transport of gambling
devices into states prohibiting gambling.46 Although states generally have
wide latitude to legalize any types of gambling, federal law since 1992 has
restricted states' abilities to operate sports-wagering games.47
The boom in Indian gambling has depended on tight federal and state limits
on other forms of gambling. The loosening of restraints on innovative gambling
venues may stifle this boom. Two growth areas for gambling lie at the limits
of federal jurisdiction, in cyberspace and on riverboats. Internet gambling is
in its infancy, but it allows for the operation of rogue offshore virtual casinos,
transactions which are illegal but beyond the reach of U.S. law enforcement.48
Meanwhile, recent changes in federal law have loosened the ban on gambling
in the federal maritime jurisdiction,4 9 permitting states to legalize riverboat
gaming in certain cases.5" To date, six states have legalized at least some
44. For a review of state gambling laws, see Victor J. Franckiewicz, Jr., Comment, The StatesAnte
Up: An Analysis of Casino Gambling Statutes, 38 LOY. L. REV. 1123 (1993).
45. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1955 (1995) federalizes the conducting, financing, managing, supervising,
directing, or owning of most gambling businesses that violate state or local laws. For a critical
discussion of this statute, see Robert W. Lee, Comment, 18 U.S.CA. Section 1955: Who Conducts an
Illegal Gambling Business? It's Just a Roll of the Dice, 12 W. ST. U. L. REv. 239 (1984). See also
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-07 (1995) (prohibiting mailing of lottery tickets other than those legal under state
law); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1511 (1995) (criminalizing conspiracy to obstruct enforcement of criminal laws
to facilitate illegal gambling business, where one or more conspirators is government official or
employee).
46. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1171-78 (1995).
47. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 3701-04 (1995). The Act
prohibits state government entities and their employees from operating sports wagering games but
exempts pre-existing games, parimutuels, jai-alai, and some exclusively local casino games.
48. Technically, gambling over the Internet violates 18 U.S.C.A. § 1084(a) (1995) (banning use
of wire communication facility for transmission of bets in interstate or foreign commerce). The Justice
Department, however, does not expect to be able to enforce the new law. See Todd Copilevitz, Foreign
Casinos Offer Old Games in New Format, NEW ORLEANS TfIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 5, 1995, at A14;
Joshua Quitmer, Betting on Virtual Vegas, TIME, June 12, 1995, at 63; James Sterngold, Ideas &
Trends: Imagine the Internet as Electronic Casino, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 1995, § 4 (Week in Review),
at 3.
49. For a discussion ofjurisdictional issues in riverboat gaming, see Jeremy R. Kriegel, Place Your
Bets on the Constitutionality of Riverboat Gambling Acts: Do They Violate the Commerce Clause?, 47
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEM . L. 123 (1995).
50. Gambling Devices Transportation (Johnson) Act, Pub. L. No. 102-251, Title II § 202(b), 106
Stat. 61 (1992) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171, 1172, 1175 (1994)). The Act exempts from
prohibition gambling devices on a vessel whose voyage begins and ends in the same state or possession
or does not make an intervening stop within another state, possession, or foreign country.
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form of riverboat gaming,5 and Congress is considering legislation that would
enable additional casinos to open. 52
Concerned about the increase in legalized gambling and its economic
consequences,53 many gambling opponents have called for the creation of a
national commission on gambling.54 Several members of Congress have
voiced concern about the increase in legalized gambling,5 and President
Clinton has agreed, in principle, to support the creation of such a commis-
sion.56 The commission would consider the increase in both Indian and non-
Indian gaming. Thus, the general loosening of regulation of non-Indian gaming
might, by prompting a backlash against all forms of gaming, lead to legislative
reconsideration of the IGRA framework. The possibility of such reconsidera-
tion was given added impetus by the decision in Seminole.'
C. Tensions Between Indian and Non-Indian Gaming Under the IGRA: A
Case Study
The recent unsuccessful effort by Connecticut's Mashantucket Pequot tribe
to open a casino in Bridgeport, Connecticut, provides a case study of the
obstacle course that may face a tribe working within the provisions of the
IGRA.55 Even when a tribe and state appear to have settled their differences,
the resulting compacts can lead to further complications. After the successful
conclusion of good-faith negotiations, the state retains the power to enact
51. The states are Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Missouri. See, e.g., S.H.A.
230 ILCS 10/1-23 (1993) (Illinois' riverboat gambling act). Other states that have considered legalization
include Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia.
52. Several bills would limit a state's authority to regulate gambling vessels traveling into the
state. See, e.g., H.R. 116, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 138, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
Another bill would exempt some vessels making voyages on Lake Michigan. H.R. 1419, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995).
53. For discussions of the economic consequences of legalized gambling, see John W. Kindt, The
Economic Impacts ofLegalized Gambling Activities, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 51 (1994); Ronald J. Rychlak,
The Introduction of Casino Gambling: Public Policy and the Law, 64 Miss. L.J. 291 (1995).
54. S. 704, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 497, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 462,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). These bills are modeled on the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-452 §§ 804-09, 84 Stat. 939, which created the earlier Commission on the Review of
the National Policy Toward Gambling, expiring four years and sixty days after enactment.
55. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H10754 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1995) (statement of Rep. Wolf); 141
CONG. REC. S10912 (daily ed. July 31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simon); 141 CONG. REC. S10916
(daily ed. July 10, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dorgan); 141 CoNG. REC. H182 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1995)
(statement of Rep. LaFalce).
56. See Henry Stem, Clinton Supports Gambling Commission Proposal, AP, Nov. 1, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 4412644.
57. Immediately after the Supreme Court's decision, Rep. Robert G. Torricelli (D-NJ) called for
hearings to assess it and to consider the adoption of a new national policy toward gambling. Greenhouse,
supra note 2, at B9.
58. The state senate ultimately defeated the proposal, 24-10. See Matthew Daly & Christopher
Keating, Bridgeport Casino Dies in Senate, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 18, 1995, at Al.
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statewide gambling laws over non-Indian lands, 9 and this power fundamental-
ly affects interaction between the state, the tribe, and other gaming interests.
In this case, although the Pequots' proposal involved off-reservation land, it
illustrates tensions common to all tribe-state interactions related to gambling.
If a state does decide to expand gambling beyond reservations, as
Connecticut considered, a tribe may seek to maintain its monopoly by
controlling off-reservation gambling as well. The land in Bridgeport was not
owned by the Pequots, so a casino there required state authorization.' One
reason that the Pequots' proposal became controversial61 is that the Pequots
already operate the Western Hemisphere's most profitable casino, the
Foxwoods Resort Casino in Ledyard, Connecticut, which grosses $1 billion62
annually.' The Pequots had been able to open Foxwoods only after resistance
from the state.' The new complex would have cost an estimated $875 million
to build and would have been just fifty-five miles from Manhattan, less than
half the distance between Manhattan and Atlantic City, New Jersey.'s
Because tribal casinos are tax-free enterprises under federal law,' they
have a competitive advantage over other gambling operators. However, a tribal
casino will be most attractive to prospective gamblers when there are few
alternative wagering outlets, so it is in a tribe's interest to persuade the state
59. Before rejecting the Pequots' plan, the Connecticut legislature considered several bills that
would have imposed burdens on casino operators. See, e.g., 1995 Conn. H.B. 6823 (providing for
environmental impact evaluations of casino gaming facilities); 1995 Conn. H.B. 6579 (concerning
political contributions by gaming interests); 1995 Conn. H.B. 5446 (prohibiting state-court enforcement
of gambling debts in excess of $10,000).
60. Under the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 465 (1994), the Pequots may transfer land
the tribe has purchased to the United States in trust, subject to Department of Interior approval, and may
then establish gambling facilities on the land. Connecticut is currently suing to void an Interior
Department decision authorizing the transfer of land by the Pequots in the vicinity of the Foxwoods
casino. See Connecticut er rel Blumenthal v. Babbitt, 899 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn. 1995). U.S. Sen.
Lieberman (D-CT) has introduced a bill that would require the Interior Department to take a tribe's
economic status into account before allowing such a transfer in trust for commercial purposes including
gaming. S. 952, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
61. See Matthew Daly, Bridgeport's Sole Hope Is Casino, Officials Told, HARTFORD COURANT,
Oct. 31, 1995, at A7; Jonathan Rabinovitz, Rowland Tells Legislature Bridgeport Needs a Casino, N.Y.
Timbs, Oct. 26, 1995, at B7.
62. This is over five times more than the gross of the next most successful tribal casino. See Pat
Doyle, Nations Within a Nation, STAR TRIBUNE, July 23, 1995, at IA.
63. The history of the Pequot Tribe is a rags-to-riches story. See Wil Haygood, Did the Pequots
Hit the Jackpot?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 17, 1995, at 61; Ian Katz, The Dibe That Found a Fortune,
GUARDIAN, July 29, 1995, at 23.
64. The State contended that it was not required to enter good-faith negotiations with the Pequots
because it prohibited gambling generally, but the Second Circuit ruled that because it permitted "Las
Vegas nights" in certain circumstances, it was required to enter such negotiations under the IGRA.
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1029-32 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 975 (1991).
65. Jonathan Rabinovitz, Casino Bid Gets Backing of Rowland, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 2, 1995, at BI.
66. The House Ways and Means Committee voted to impose a tax on Indian casinos, but the Senate
Finance Committee refused to go along with such a tax after lobbying by the Pequots and other tribes.
See H.R. 2491, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 13631 (version of Oct. 31, 1995); see also David Lightman,
GOP in Senate Shuns Tax on Indian Casinos, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 19, 1995, at Al.
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government not to legalize other casinos or forms of gambling. At the same
time, a tribal casino is a threat to other gambling enterprises; perhaps
unsurprisingly, competing wagering interests formed the primary opposition to
the Pequots' Bridgeport proposal. Among those opposing the Pequots'
proposal were Las Vegas-based Mirage Resorts, Inc.,67 Connecticut parimu-
tuel companies,68 and the Mohegan Indian tribe.69
Although Indian tribes are sovereigns not subject to taxation by the state,
the possibility that the state will legalize forms of gambling off reservations
gives tribes incentives to agree to pay states considerable fees. An earlier
Indian gaming compact clouded the ramifications of the Pequot proposal. In
April 1994, the Mohegan Tribe had signed an agreement with Connecticut
promising an annual payment to the state of twenty-five percent of slot-machine
revenues or at least $80 million as long as Connecticut law enforced a Pequot-
Mohegan slot-machine duopoly.70 The Pequot Tribe also signed an amend-
ment to its earlier Memorandum of Understanding with the State, applying
similar terms to the Pequots' relationship with Connecticut. These agreements
gave the Pequots an advantage over Mirage Resorts in negotiation with
Connecticut, since the Pequots would be released from their payment
obligations if the state were to grant the casino, which would include slot
machines, to Mirage Resorts.7" Furthermore, although the Pequots' initial bid
called for it to pay twenty-five percent of slot revenues from whichever of the
two casinos had greater revenues, it later enhanced its offer by promising
instead to supplement its current Foxwoods payments with twenty percent of
Bridgeport slot revenues.72 Partly offsetting the potential financial windfall for
Connecticut from the Pequots' proposal, the Mohegan Tribe threatened not to
tender its promised payment if Connecticut authorized any new Bridgeport
casino, arguing that the casino would violate the 1994 agreement.' Thus the
67. Mirage Resorts submitted a competing bid for a Bridgeport casino. Mirage had agreed to
compensate the state for slot-machine revenues that the state would lose under other agreements, but
only if it promised not to delay construction by suing for environmental or other reasons. See Matthew
Daly, Pequots Selected for Bridgeport Casino, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 3, 1995, at Al, A10.
68. Connecticut has six parimutuel gambling sites, five of which would have received slot machines
under the Mirage Resorts proposal. Legislators from districts including these sites were particularly
hostile to the Pequot plan. Id.
69. The Mohegan Tribe is currently building a casino in Montvile, Connecticut, about 10 minutes
from Foxwoods. See Sam Libby, In Montville, a Mohegan Casino Grows, N.Y. TMES, Nov. 12, 1995,
§ CN (Connecticut Weekly), at 19.
70. Gaming Compact, Apr. 25, 1994, Conn.-Mohegan Tribe; see Connecticut Signs Deal for
Second Indian-Run Casino, LAS VEGAS REv. ., Apr. 27, 1994, at 12D; Weicker Signs Casino Pact,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 27, 1994, at 46; see also Op. Conn. Att'y Gen. No. 94-010 (May 18, 1994)
(arguing that governor had power to strike deal with Mohegans).
71. See Jonathan Rabinovitz, Tribe Threatens to WithholdIts Payment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1995,
atB6.
72. See Phil Primack, Pequots Sweeten Bridgeport Casino Proposal, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 21,
1995, at 52.
73. Rabinovitz, supra note 71.
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state's legislative power gives tribes incentives to agree to provide cash
payments as long as other casino gambling in the state is illegal. Tribes will
subsequently use such compacts, which are enforceable in federal court, to
dissuade states from legalizing further off-reservation gambling.
D. Conclusion
The public policy ramifications of increased gambling under the IGRA are
legion. On the one hand, many Indian tribes have moved strongly toward
pride, economic self-sufficiency, and sovereignty as they have become "major
players in national and state politics."74 On the other hand, gambling is both
an inconstant, unpredictable revenue source and a potentially destructive social
force.75 Indian tribes, unlike states or localities, are often so economically
dependent and isolated that they have little economic stability to lose by
establishing casinos.' Yet these tribes may begin to see their gambling
revenues drop as states, and other tribes, begin to compete for the same
"consumers."' Moreover, Indian tribes that choose to open gambling
facilities may begin to suffer the same crime, addiction, and other harms
generally associated with gambling.78 Insofar as the Indian gambling explosion
accounts for much of the growth in legalized gambling nationwide, the
regulation of Indian gaming must take into account harms caused both inside
and outside the reservations. The decision in Seminole, while limiting the
federal judicial power to coerce states to accept casino gambling on Indian
reservations, does not preclude a new federal effort to formulate a national
policy on these issues. Ultimate resolution of whether the federal government
or state governments exercise regulatory authority over Indian gaming may
determine how its harms are weighed against its benefits.
- Michael Abramowicz and Partha Chattoraj
74. Id. at 106.
75. Robert Goodman's 1995 study enumerates a number of harms caused by increased gambling,
including compulsive behavior; economic losses; increased crime; lowered property values; lost private
and public human and financial capital for productive investment; and decreased consumer spending with
resultant local retail, tourism, and service industry failures. GOODMAN, supra note 34, passim.
76. Id. at 109.
77. Id. at 110-11.
78. Problem gambling rates in the Native American population are two to three times higher than
those among the white population. Among several North Dakota tribes that have legalized gambling,
the rates are even higher. Don A. Conzetto, The Economic and SocialImplications of Indian Gambling:
The Case of Minnesota, 19 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 1 (1995); Don A. Conzetto & Brent W.
LaRogue, Compulsive Gambling in the Indian Community: A North Dakota Case Study (1995)
(unpublished manuscript) (both cited in GOODMAN, supra note 34, at 209 n. 10).
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II. RECALIBRATING AN UNEQUAL BALANCE:
GRANTING WEIGHT To SACRED SITE CLAIMS
The land is my relative, we are one, we are all connected and interrelated... . The
earth is our mother, the sky is our father. We are related to every living thing, and
even the clouds, the buttes, springs, rocks; they all have spirits and they are also
our relatives. 9
Religion permeates every aspect of traditional Native American life; no
division exists between the spiritual and the secular."o The interdependence
of all entities in nature comprises the essence of Native American spirituali-
ty;"' all things-animate and inanimate-possess a soul.' All life forms are
sacred gifts from the Creator,83 and humans are to act as responsible
caretakers of the environment, preserving harmony among all natural
elements. 4 Land forms the cornerstone of this concept of unity, so the earth
itself is a fundamental religious symbol. 5 While Native Americans treat all
79. Improvement of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act: Hearings Before the Select
Committee on Indian Affairs United States Senate on S. 2250, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 217 (1988)
(affidavit of Kee Shay) (quoted in Scott Hardt, Comment, The Sacred Public Lands: Improper Line
Drawing in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Analysis, 60 U. CoLO. L. REv. 601, 605 n.24).
80. It is not surprising, then, that the policies and laws of the United States, which are founded on
the notion of separation of church and state, conflict with American Indian religious practices on many
fronts. Economic development of federaily-managed public lands, for example, has often desecrated
native sacred sites. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988); Havasupai Tribe v. Robertson, 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980). Drug
enforcement laws have banned the religious use of peyote. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Endangered species laws and a desire to protect the
symbol of America have infringed upon the use of eagle feathers in American Indian religious
ceremonies. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986); United States v. Abeyta, 632 F.
Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986). Finally, the need to maintain order and uniformity has prevented Native
American prisoners from adorning themselves in a religious manner. See, e.g., Polloch v. Marshall, 845
F.2d 656 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 987 (1988). While each of these topics raises important
questions, we focus on the first as a guide to exploring the development of American policy on Native
American religious freedom. For a description of many of the policies undertaken to destroy Native
American religions, see Sharon L. O'Brien, Freedom of Religion in Indian Country, 56 MONT. L.
REV. 451 (1995).
81. See John Rhodes, An American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of NativeAmericans, 52
MoNT. L. REv. 13, 22 (1991). There are over 500 Native American nations, practicing a variety of
religions. Discussing these many religions at any but the most general level is beyond the scope of this
essay.
82. See Hardt, supra note 79, at 605.
83. See Mary C. Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty:A New Trust Paradigm for
FederalActions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109, 195 & n.379 (1995);
see also Rhodes, supra note 81, at 19.
84. See Wood, supra note 83, at 195-96 & n.381.
85. See Hardt, supra note 79, at 605.
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land respectfully,' 6 tribal groups may cherish particular natural locations as
sacred.' Certain mountain peaks, desert cliff formations, or river valleys may
represent the legendary birthplace of a tribal people, provide a dwelling place
for the gods, or yield rare medicinal herbs or waters.88 A particular sacred
site manifests a tribal people's symbiotic relationship to land that encompasses
not merely religious belief, as understood in Judeo-Christian terms, but an
entire way of life. This site-specific nature of American Indian religions
renders them uniquely vulnerable. Because these sacred sites often lie on
federally-managed public lands, 9 government-sanctioned economic develop-
ment of these sites acquires an ominous zero-sum element: once developed, a
sacred site is desecrated irrevocably," There exists no room for compro-
86. This reverent attitude toward land does not preclude all land development. The decision to use
or develop land in a certain way depends on the people's needs, taking into account the impact of such
development upon subsequent generations. A respectful decision to develop land will be blessed by the
Creator if the land provides for the tribe. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Large Binocular Telescopes, Red
Squirrel Pinatas, and Apache Sacred Mountains: Decolonizing Environmental Law in a Multicultural
World, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1133, 1153 (1994). Such decisionmaking does not apply to sacred sites: if
the site in question implicates important social, spiritual, or physical values of the tribe, development
is not even considered. Id. at 1153-54.
87. While Western religious traditions tend to be commemorative of past events, Native American
religious ceremonies embody specific purposes necessitated by present conditions. See Hardt, supra note
79, at 603. The purpose of a particular ceremony (e.g., to restore balance in nature) dictates its location;
.place" therefore assumes paramount importance in Native American religions. Id.
88. See Barbara S. Falcone, Legal Protections (Or The Lack Thereo) of American Indian Sacred
Religious Sites: The Need for Comprehensive Legislation, 41 FE). B. NEws & J. 568, 569 (1994).
89. See Donald Falk, Note, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: Bulldozing
First Amendment Protection ofIndian Sacred Lands, 16 EcOLOGY L.Q. 515, 564 n.368 (1989) (citing
Brief for Amici Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes at 22, Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986) (No. 83-2225)); Daniel McCool, FederalIndian Policy
and the Sacred Mountains ofthe Papago Indians, 9 J. ETHNIC STUD. 57 (1981)). Congress has plenary
power under the Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution to manage federal lands, U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 3, cl. 2, which today comprise 732 million acres, or one-third of the land area of the United
States. See Ann M. Hooker, American Indian Sacred Sites on Federal Public Lands: Resolving Conflicts
Between Religious Use and Multiple Use at El Maupais National Monument, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
133, 136 (1994). Most federally owned land is administered by the Bureau of Land Management, which
operates under a land use policy of multiple use, as defined in the Federal Land Policy Management Act
of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84 (1988) [hereinafter FLPMA]. Multiple use means "the management of
the public lands and their various resource values so that they are utilized in the combination that will
best meet the present and future needs of the American people .... "; 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1982),
discussed in Celia Byler, Comment, Free Access or Free Exercise?: A Choice Between Mineral
Development and American Indian Sacred Site Preservation on Public Lands, 22 CoNN. L. REv. 397,
406 n.53 (1990). While the FLPMA specifically discusses mining, grazing, habitation, cultivation, and
manufacturing, it does not mention religious uses. See Robert C. Ward, The Spirits Will Leave:
Preventing the Desecration and Destruction of Native American Sacred Sites on Federal Land, 19
ECOLOGY L.Q. 795, 804 n.58 (1992).
90. Furthermore, because the site is so tied to the Native American practice of religion, and religion
is so connected with tribal life in general, "tribal identity can dissipate within a generation as practices
lapse when the place that gave them definition lies desecrated." Falk, supra note 89, at 565-66. When
Indian society loses its defining cultural characteristics, it risks losing its political autonomy as well. See
Wood, supra note 83, at 193. Federal recognition of tribes extends only to those "which are ethnically
and culturally identifiable." Id. at 194 & n.375 (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 83.3(a) (1994)).
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Judicial and legislative approaches thus far, nonetheless, have attempted to
compromise through balancing tests' and toothless administrative or
procedural protections.93 In practice, these existing approaches fail to weigh
adequately Native American religious liberty because of a deeply embedded
cultural bias that aggravates existing limitations of the cost-benefit analysis
underlying the evaluation of competing interests. Explicit legislative protection
that consciously prioritizes Native American religious liberty is necessary to
offset the ethnocentrism that dismisses Native Americans' relationships to
land,' blinds policy makers to the zero-sum proportions of the issue, and
ultimately permits bulldozers to raze the mountains and floodwaters to
91. By comparison, when a Western religious facility is threatened with destruction, the church
usually owns the property in question and is entitled to just compensation for its loss. See, e.g., Pillar
of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 509 P.2d 1250 (Colo. 1973). Native Americans, on the other
hand, usually lack property interests in the lands in question. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d
172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1161 (6th Cir. 1980).
Justice O'Connor noted in Lyng that "[w ] hatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area...
those rights do not divest the Government of its rights to use what is, after all, its land." 485 U.S. at
453 (emphasis in original). However, as one commentator noted, "The 'property interest' basis for
denying the free exercise claims raises the question, of course, of where the government 'got' the
property in the first place .... If the taking was unjust to begin with, it seems especially egregious to
use the lack of a legal interest in land to deny a free exercise claim for protection of preexisting sacred
sites." Sarah B. Gordon, Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of Public
Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447, 1455 n.32 (1985). Moreover, even if a given sacred site were the private
property of the tribe, its loss is not compensable, nor is relocation a viable alternative.
Interestingly, Western religions dominant in the United States also recognize the "holiness" of
certain places, but the "holy sites" of such religions are located beyond American borders in their
countries of origin. See Falcone, supra note 88, at 568. Were Jerusalem, Bethlehem, or Mecca situated
within the United States, Congress probably would enact measures to prevent development on such
lands. To Native Americans, sacred sites such as Bear Butte, Rainbow Bridge, and Mount Graham are
just as vital and worthy of such protection. Id.
92. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbertv. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
93. See, e.g., American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (AIRFA);
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994) (RFRA). An exception
to this is the trust doctrine, or the government's fiduciary duty toward Native Americans (as wards of
the United States government) to preserve the Native American way of life. See, e.g., Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Jeri Beth
K. Ezra, Comment, The Trust Doctrine: A Source of Protection for Native American Sacred Sites, 38
CATH. U. L. REV. 705 (arguing trust doctrine should be extended specifically to include sacred site
claims). When applied to Indian reservation lands, the trust doctrine avoids a balancing of interests
because the government owes an uncompromising responsibility to the tribe and its members. See Wood,
supra note 75, at 211. However, the trust doctrine has fared poorly where invoked to protect cultural
or religious practices on publicly-held lands because in such cases the government's fiduciary
obligation toward the tribe clashes with its concomitant obligation to the interests of other constituencies.
Id. at 211, 230-31. Where such tension exists in sacred site claims, courts tend either to ignore the trust
claim as an argument separate from constitutional or statutory claims, e.g., Havasupai Tribe v. United
States, 752 F. Supp. at 1488 (interpreting AIRFA); or to defer to congressional intent, requiring the
trust obligation to be predicated on express language in a statute, treaty, or executive order. See Wood,
supra note 75, at 212 & nn.458, 460. Attempts to reconcile this tension fall prey to the kind of
ethnocentric bias that pervades the balancing of interests process of these cases. See infra notes 100-103
and accompanying text.
94. See Rhodes, supra note 81, at 22-23.
95. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(involving timber harvesting and road construction through forest land considered sacred by Yurok,
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drown the gods.9
A. The Present Judicial Approach
1. The Traditional Compelling Interest Test
When Native Americans bring valid sacred site claims, the court weighs the
religious values of Native Americans against the interests of the government
in a First Amendment "compelling interest test," first articulated in Sherbert
v. Verner.7 The Sherbert two-part, strict scrutiny test requires the court to
determine if the government action creates a burden on the free exercise of
religion, 98 and if so, whether a compelling government interest justifies the
burden.99
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis Influenced by Ethnocentric Bias
A cost-benefit framework fueled largely by utilitarian values underpins this
balancing of religious and secular interests. Where the costs to government of
protecting a particular liberty appear to exceed the benefits, that liberty will be
denied. Although generally a useful tool for evaluating public policies, cost-
benefit analysis is inherently limited in free exercise claims because it is not
meaningful to attach dollar value to religious freedom.100 Because the
government interest in development is likely to be concretely monetizeable, it
can tend to overshadow the more abstract value inherent in free exercise.
In Native American sacred site claims, cultural bias tends to exacerbate the
natural imbalance created by this limitation of a monetized cost-benefit
analysis. American judicial conceptions of religion are heavily influenced by
Karok, and Talowa Indians); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (involving expansion of
ski area in mountain peaks deemed sacred by Hopi and Navajo tribes).
96. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980) (flooding of canyon
drowned Navajo gods at Rainbow Bridge); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1160
(6th Cir. 1980) (flooding of valley threatened to destroy Cherokee sacred sites, medicine gathering sites
and cemeteries).
97. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972).
98. "Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S. CONSr.
amend. I. cl. 1.
99. In 1990, the Supreme Court set aside Sherbert and its progeny in Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and resurrected a belief-conduct distinction first
established in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, the Court upheld a
Mormon's conviction under Utah's antipolygamy statute, finding that the government may have the
right to intervene when beliefs become actions. In Smith, the Court found that it had "never held that
an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that the State is free to regulate." 494 U.S. at 878-79. Smith applied a rational relationship test
to conclude that generally applicable laws that are facially neutral require no special justification to
satisfy First Amendment scrutiny. In direct response, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993 to reinstate the Sherbert compelling interest test. For a discussion of
the impact of RFRA on sacred site claims, see infra text accompanying notes 126-130.
100. See Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of
Religious Freedom, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 46 (1989).
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the Enlightenment tradition which separates the religious from secular life.10
Additionally, sacred site claims must confront a governing culture historically
dedicated to the conquest of nature'02 and economic development that
contrasts fundamentally with Native American principles of communal property
and stewardship of the earth. From the government's perspective, economic
development of these areas produces legitimate net social benefits of public
goods or private profits. However, an ethnocentric lens may distort the
negative impact on indigenous religious practices and cause the government to
discount (or disregard) any positive externalities generated by the preservation
of these lands. As a result, our constitutional, legislative, and judicially
constructed legal doctrines can systemically disadvantage Native American
beliefs or ways of life.1 3
3. Lyng and the Failure of Native American Free Exercise Claims
In practice, ethnocentric bias slants the cost-benefit analysis in sacred site
cases in that courts fail to find that the government act constitutes a "burden"
on religion.11 In turn, this prevents claims from ever reaching the true
balance of interests required by Sherbert. Free exercise claims can be deeply
troubling to courts because they often call for cessation of a legitimate
government policy with valid secular justifications,"° and they may encroach
upon the Establishment Clause."t To the extent that these claims create
discomfort, it is not surprising to find courts looking to sidestep the balancing
test by turning to restrictive threshold burden requirements. 107 "Burden,"
then, functions as a "gatekeeper" in Free Exercise law,108 serving to
distinguish the boundaries of claims that warrant constitutional review.
However, determination of this threshold requirement lacks a coherent and
principled approach in the case law, creating a risk of discrimination against
unconventional religious practices and beliefs."° The 1988 Supreme Court
101. See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 81, at 16.
102. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 91, at 1464 ("The pioneer and development ideals of the
westward movement in the nineteenth century glorified taming the wilds in the interests of progress and
prosperity.").
103. See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 81, at 16.
104. Likewise, the court may avoid a true balancing of interests by focusing only on compelling
government interests and refusing to reach the question of burden. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 638
F.2d 172, 177 n.4 (10th Cir. 1980).
105. See, e.g., Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1163 (6th Cir. 1980).
106. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend.
I, cl. 1; see Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion,
102 HARV. L. REv. 933, 947 (1989); see also Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d at 179 (issuing
regulations to exclude tourists from sacred site would implicate Establishment Clause).
107. See Lupu, supra note 106, at 948.
108. Id. at 935.
109. Id. at 936. For example, court bias may discount the various elements of a prima facie claim,
challenging the cognizability of the asserted burden, the sincerity of the claimant, and the religiosity of
the claim in ways that may operate invisibly and subconsciously against unknown or unpopular religions.
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decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n ° illustrates
this process.
Lyng dismantled Native American claims that government development of
sacred site lands impinges on their First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion. Although the Court explicitly recognized that construction of a road
through sacred Indian land could have a devastating impact on the practice of
Native American religion,"' the Court held that the government act did not
burden religion because it "ha[d] no tendency to coerce individuals into acting
contrary to their religious beliefs . ... "112 Absent a finding of burden, the
government did not need to show any compelling interest for building the road,
despite a rich case record that clearly demonstrated both the road's minimal
utility,1 as well as the consequent harm to both Native Americans and the
environment. The Court not only discounted Native American religious claims,
but also placed most federal land management activity beyond Free Exercise
scrutiny 4 by casting the decision of the Forest Service to build the road on
government land as an "internal government procedure."11
In addition to the "coercion" requirement emphasized in Lyng116 lower
courts handling earlier sacred site claims erected a "centrality" 7 or "indis-
pensability""51 hurdle that specifically targeted Native American plaintiffs
trying to establish a burden on religion. However, both "centrality" and
"indispensability" can be influenced by judicial subjectivity that assigns a
qualitatively different value to land and land use than that given by Native
Americans. This may preclude a finding of burden and a subsequent fair
Id. at 935; see also Tania Saison, Restoring Obscurity: The Shortcomings of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBS. 653, 671 (1995) (arguing that evaluation of degree
of burden inevitably replaces religious values of claimant with those of judicial body).
110. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
111. Id. at451.
112. Id. at 450. The coercive effect requirement was discussed in School Dist. of Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963), and further developed in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
113. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 463 (discussing district court findings regarding insufficiency of the
government interests served by road) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Falk, supra note 89, at525-26 & nn.91-
100.
114. See Falk, supra note 89, at 564.
115. The "internal government procedures" test was also developed in Bowen v. Roy: "The Free
Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal
affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.... The Free Exercise
Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not
afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures." 476 U.S.
693, 699-700 (1986).
116. Lower federal courts also required Native American plaintiffs to show coercive effect. See,
e.g., Fools Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 790 (D.S.D. 1982).
117. See, e.g., Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1980)
(requiring Cherokee plaintiffs to show centrality of river valley to religion to establish burden).
118. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (requiring Navajo and
Hopi Indians to justify First Amendment claim by demonstrating, at minimum, indispensability of site
to religious practice).
Yale Law & Policy Review
balancing of interests. 119
B. The Present Legislative Approach
Thus far, legislative redress has also failed to protect Native American
religious liberty interests. The failure is not surprising as sacred site claims
generally raise the specter of creating a stranglehold on public land develop-
ment. 12° As a result, statutes concerned with cultural and environmental
preservation that are often too narrow in scope to encompass sacred sites,
121
even those specifically aimed at American Indians, fail to establish viable
causes of action or to grant outright protection of sacred sites.
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 197811 (AIRFA)
119. See Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164-65. Absent centrality, the court found no burden, and
therefore no need to balance opposing interests. The dissent urged remand to permit plaintiffs to prove
centrality. Id. at 1165.
120. Cf. Gordon. supra note 91, at 1464. Congress has created a handful of site-specific exemptions
by placing sacred land in trust for a particular tribe, e.g., Act of Dec. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-550,
84 Stat. 1437 (placing 48,000 acres around Blue Lake in Carson National Forest as a wilderness area
in trust for the Pueblo de Taos Indians); Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-620, 88 Stat. 2092
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 228 (i) (1988)) (placing 185,000 acres of the Grand Canyon National Park in
trust for the Havasupai Indians as part of their reservation); by setting aside tracts of sacred land in the
Six Rivers National Forest as wilderness area, California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-425,
98 Star. 1619 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 46 note, 80 note, 543, 543a-543h, 1132 note, 1274 (1988)),
cited in Lyng, 485 U.S. at 444-45; and by setting aside the El Malpais lava flows in New Mexico as
a national monument, El Malpais Act, Pub. L. No. 100-225, 101 Stat. 1539 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 460uu to 460uu-50 (1988 Supp. n1 1991)). For a discussion of these exemptions, see Hooker, supra
note 81, at 139-40; see also Russell L. Barsh, The llusion of Religious Freedom for Indigenous
Americans, 65 OR. L. REv. 363, 408 (1986). However, despite these specific protections, the
government was plainly fearful of establishing precedent, and did not wish to express a national policy
on handling sacred site claims. Id. at 408-09. "'[O]rdinarily, of course, Indian land claims are being,
and should be, settled by cash award.'" Id. at 409 n.315 (quoting President Nixon, 8 WEEKLY COMP.
OF PRES. DoC. 880).
121. For example, the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470w-6 (1988 &
Supp. 1111991), preserves only sites that may contain some sort of archaeological/historical value-for
example, manmade edifices such as old Spanish missionaries in the southwest-but not necessarily a
pristine wilderness area. The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-
470mm (1988), fails to protect religious sites because it does not ensure confidentiality of the site; such
secrecy is often necessary to maintain the site's sacredness. Furthermore, the sites remain vulnerable
to desecration by archaeologists. See Ward, supra note 89, at 819-20. The Antiquities Act of 1906, 16
U.S.C. §§ 431-33 (1988), invests the President with authority to designate sites as national monuments,
but such status is difficult to achieve and brings with it the threat of tourism. See Ward, supra note 89,
at 817-18. None of these cultural preservation statutes confers any substantive rights, with the possible
exception of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013
(Supp. V 1993), which may protect a sacred site, but only if it is a source of human remains and
artifacts.
Environmental statutes also fall short of protecting sacred sites, except where sacred sites happen
to fall within broader environmental values. The goal of the Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1131-1136 (1988) is to "leave [lands] unimpaired for future use," 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (a), but does
not speak to the preservation of sacred sites. The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544,
may prevent a sacred site from desecration by land development, but only where the land also happens
to be the habitat of an endangered species. For a summary of these statutory schemes, see Ward, supra
note 89, at 817-21.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).
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attempted to redress past injustices" and give proper weight to Native
American religious claims by declaring that "it shall be the policy of the United
States to protect and preserve" Native American religious freedom. 124
AIRFA, however, depends on federal administrative good will for its
implementation."as The Act allows agencies to give little more than a
perfunctory nod to tribal concerns by stating that such issues should be
considered when a land site is to be developed."a AIRFA fails even to
require any detailed environmental impact evaluation such as that required by
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.127 Moreover, any residual
power the Act might have wielded was nullified in Lyng, which concluded that
"[n]owhere in [AIRFA] is there so much as a hint of any intent to create a
cause of action or any judicially enforceable individual rights.""
In 1993, the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs drafted amendments
to AIRFA to address its deficiencies, 912  but resistance from constituencies
interested in developing public lands potentially subject to sacred site protection
tabled the legislation at the start of the 104th Congress in 1994.130 Section
103 of the Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act would have required
the Secretary of the Interior to consult with tribes in an ongoing process to
identify sacred sites.131 While this was an improvement over AIRFA, this
attempt to compromise still would have failed to protect Native American
interests adequately. First, disclosure of the site to the government, even if the
Department of the Interior maintains confidentiality, impinges upon the privacy
123. See Ward, supra note 89, at 816 & n.129.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1996.
125. See Barsh, supra note 112, at 411.
126. Lyng, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 746-47 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988) (NEPA). NEPA is best known for its requirement that, prior
to taking any major federal action "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment," the
responsible federal agency must prepare a document known as an Environmental Impact Statement. 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c); see Dean B. Suagee, The Application of the Natural Environmental Policy Act to
"Development" in Indian Country, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 377, 383 (1991). Section 101(b)(4) of
NEPA calls for the preservation of "important historic cultural, and natural aspects of our natural
heritage;" however, NEPA's protection is procedural only-it does not create substantive rights. See
Suagee, supra note 127, at 379, 385-86 (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 557 (1978), and quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)).
128. 485 U.S. at 455.
129. Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act of 1993 (NAFERA), S. 1021, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993).
130. See Wood, supra note 75, at 206 & n.433. Congress did pass a limited amendment providing
for traditional religious use of peyote by Indians. See infra text accompanying notes 138-143.
131. NAFERA contains a list of forty-four very specific and limited areas nationwide that are
Indian sacred sites currently threatened by government development. See Luralene D. Tapahe,
Comment, After The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Still No Equal Protection for First American
Worshippers, 24 N.M. L. REV. 331,357 & n. 121 (citing WALTER ECHO-HAwK, BRIEFING DOCUMENT:
NATIVE AMERICAN FREE EXERCISE OF RELGION ACT (S. 1021) 3 (1993)).
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necessary to maintain the sacredness of the site.132 Second, consultation with
tribal leaders about the sanctity of particular land may inadvertently exclude
true religious traditionalists who may be uninvolved in tribal politics.
33
Finally, the legislation only called for temporary closing of sacred sites "made
so as to affect the smallest practicable area for the minimum period necessary
for such purposes."134 Such compromise is, at best, a temporary solution,
because it still risks allowing land uses that may desecrate a particular site.
The other major legislation purporting to protect American Indian religious
liberty is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 35 (RFRA) which codified
the compelling government interest test. However, as argued above, the bur-
den/compelling interest test, as currently applied, fails to protect Indian
religious freedom 36 and nothing in RFRA changes traditional treatment of
sacred site claims. 137 Furthermore, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that
traditional Free Exercise jurisprudence "makes it clear that strict scrutiny does
not apply to government actions involving only management of internal
government affairs or the use of the government's own property or resourc-
es." 138 While government action need only further a goal, Native American
interests will continue to be held to a "centrality" or "indispensability"
requirement. 39 In sum, RFRA does little to address existing problems that
allow cultural bias to distort any meaningful balancing of interests.
C. Proposed Statutory Protection
Despite the shortcomings of existing legislation, the current status of Free
Exercise jurisprudence compels Native Americans seeking full protection of
their religious liberty to turn to Congress. Hence Congress should enact
specific statutory protection that automatically shields a sacred site once a
burden on religious liberty is established. Given the inherent inability to put a
price on religious liberty, granting automatic protection to Native American
sacred sites once a burden is established works to level an otherwise unequal
playing field.14
132. See Barsh, supra note 112, at 409 ("Indians' religious beliefs and practices cannot be
accommodated by the 'multiple use' of public lands because they depend so intimately on privacy and
the maintenance of land in a natural condition.").
133. See Ward, supra note 89, at 839. For an anecdotal discussion of factionalism among the
Apache tribe in a sacred site dispute, see Williams, supra note 86, at 1158-63.
134. S. 1021, § 102 (c)(3).
135. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
136. Furthermore, it is not clear that Congress has the authority to tell the judiciary how to
adjudicate constitutional claims. See O'Brien, Freedom of Religion in Indian Country, supra note 80,
at 471.
137. See Tapahe, supra note 131, at 345.
138. Id. at 345-46 (quoting S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt.V(c)).
139. Id. at 347; see supra notes 109-110.
140. Cf. Wood, supra note 83, at 232 (calling for substantive test that prioritizes native needs).
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Michael W. McConnell and Richard A. Posner offer an economic approach
to religious liberty that mandates that benefits or burdens on religion must be
measured relative to a baseline of "neutrality." 14 1 That is, a religion may be
aided or penalized, so long as the benefits or burdens have basically neutral
consequences for other religious institutions. 4 2 Where a compelling govern-
ment interest to produce a public good burdens free exercise, 143 they argue
that the balance of interests should not be presumptively weighted in either
direction.'" At the same time, however, they recognize that institutional
concern might justify a shift away from an even balance to create a presump-
tion in favor of minority religious practices and compensate for the likelihood
that these practices will not be granted equal weight. 45 McConnell and
Posner note, however, that such prioritization presumes some noneconomic
justification."4 In sacred site claims, this prioritization would counter the
effects of ethnocentric bias.
Recent congressional action on Native Americans' religious use of
peyote 47 illustrates the possibility of successful legislative redress to create
outright protection of religious liberty. Before 1990, state courts were divided
on the issue of whether the First Amendment entitled Native Americans to use
141. McConnell & Posner, supra note 100, at 1.
142. Id. at 12. According to McConnell and Posner, a burden on religion is a government action
that creates a substitution effect coupled with a disproportionate burden. Id. at 39. Sometimes this
burden is created by controlling the necessities of religious practice rather than through government
regulation of religious activity. Id. at 43. Therefore, where the government has taken possession of the
sole holy sites of a religion, it impermissibly burdens that religion, and must, at a minimum, allow
religious exercise at the sites to continue. rd.
143. For sacred site cases, this may involve mining, logging, recreation, etc.
144. McConnell & Posner, supra note 100, at 47. They note however, that courts must frame the
inquiry as a balance of the marginal impact on religious freedom and government interests, rather than
the particular individual burden against a powerful but abstract government interest that may dwarf the
Free Exercise claim. In the typical sacred site case, this means the government ought to be limited to
the particular impact of the particular site, not a broad government interest in maintaining property
rights in public lands. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. McConnell and Posner nonetheless call for a traditional balancing of interests and assume
a true balance is possible without creating a presumption that protects minority religious practices. Id.
at 54. While they note that the injury to the plaintiffs in Lyng appeared substantially to outweigh the
secular interests in that case, id. at 48, they fail to examine (or offer a method for examining) the more
difficult case in which the government interests loom much larger, implying that a case involving strong
secular interests might favor the government, even if the same destructive impact on religion as existed
in Lyng were present. McConnell and Posner's neutrality test calls for the balance to be even: Indians'
religious claims must be given weight commensurate with the secular claims of others, but by failing
to embrace a conscious prioritizing of religious liberty, they ultimately bring the sacred site quandary
no closer to resolution.
147. Peyote is currently listed as a controlled substance in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (1988). In designating peyote as an illegal substance,
Congress specifically stated that it did not intend to cover Native Americans' religious use of the drug.
The regulations to implement the law provide that "[tihe listing of peyote as a controlled substance...
does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American
Church." 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31.
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an otherwise illegal drug in their religious ceremonies.' Then, in Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 149 the Supreme
Court held that states outlawing peyote use were not required to make religious
use exemptions without performing a compelling interest test.15 0 In direct
response to this challenge, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 to reinstate the test.151 Congress later corrected possible constitu-
tional deficiencies of RFRA 52 by simply legalizing Native American
religious use of peyote in the 1994 amendments to the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act.
The peyote exemption illustrates that legislative prioritization of Native
American religious liberty is possible. Obviously the cost-benefit relationship
in this particular realm is straightforward, since the costs to government of
allowing a small number of American Indians to use peyote for religious
purposes are minimal; it is nonetheless a useful example of legislative success.
Considering that the opportunity costs of preserving tracts of pristine public
lands appear considerably more substantial, any statute truly seeking to protect
sacred sites must consciously prioritize religious liberty once a legitimate
burden is determined, or the purely economic (and calculable) opportunity costs
to the State will almost invariably outweigh the intangible non-economic
benefits of preserving the First Amendment Free Exercise rights of American
Indians. Establishing such a priority may not be so revolutionary. For example,
the trust doctrine creates an uncompromising obligation of the government to
protect and preserve Native American interests.53
While the proposed prioritization of religious liberty does not escape the
dilemma of determining an initial burden, McConnell and Posner's "neutrali-
ty" baseline marks a fair starting point. It is not flawless, but it at least
constitutes a more conscious and informed balancing process. Ultimately, the
solution lies with Congress, not the courts. Justice O'Connor recognized as
much in Lyng, when she observed that "[tihe Constitution does not, and courts
cannot, offer to reconcile the various competing demands on government, many
148. For example, in State v. Big Sheep, 243 P. 1067 (Mont. 1926), the Montana Supreme Court
found that the criminalization of all peyote use did not violate the First Amendment rights of Crow tribe
members since it was consistent with the state's interest in maintaining the "peace, good order and
safety of the state." According to Article I1 §4 of the Montana State Constitution, "the liberty of
conscience hereby secured shall not ... justify practices inconsistent with the good order, peace, or
safety of the state." Id. at 1073. Conversely, the California Supreme Court found that "the use of peyote
incorporates the essence of [Native American] religious expression," thus warranting First Amendment
protection. People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1964). Because the state failed to show harmful
effects of religious peyote use, the court found there was no compelling government interest to justify
the infringement of the Navajo's religious use of peyote. Id.
149. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
150. 494 U.S. at 882-90.
151. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
152. See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 85.
Vol. 14:353, 1996
Developments in Policy: Federal Indian Law
of them rooted in sincere religious belief, that inevitably arise in so diverse a
society as ours. That task, to the extent that it is feasible, is for the legislatures
and other institutions." "'
- Monica Marquez and Elizabeth Fishman
III. NATIVE AMERICAN TRUSTS
On November 7, 1995 a divided panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held section 465 of the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 to be "an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power."155
For sixty-one years, section 465, which empowers the Secretary of the Interior
to acquire land "for the purpose of providing land for Indians,"1 6 has been
the centerpiece of Native American economic development.
The decision in South Dakota and City of Oacoma v. United States
Department of the Interior, calling into question the status of all land held in
trust by the federal government for Native American tribes, is the latest
example of the rapid change and confusion associated with Native American
attempts to expand development efforts. If the decision in South Dakota is
upheld on review it will radically alter the field of Native American-federal
government'57 relations as well as threaten the current regulatory structure
of Native American activities.
Should the Supreme Court uphold the Eighth Circuit ruling it would mark
the first time a statute has been nullified on grounds of undue legislative
delegation since the New Deal and would be only the third such holding
ever.5 This history, in light'of the fact of millions of acres of land already
placed in trust under the Act over the past half-century, suggests that the
decision is likely to be overturned.
But even if it is overruled, the decision may have deep ramifications for
Native American-federal government relations. The decision is part of a larger
context of increasing municipal disgruntlement over perceived Native American
economic success at the expense of local businesses and government. Issues of
154. Lyng, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988).
155. South Dakota v. United States Department of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878, 880 (8th Cir. 1995),
reh'g denied, Feb. 2, 1996.
156. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1994)
157. This essay uses the term "government" when all levels of government-federal, state and
local-are implicated.
158. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Dissenting in South Dakota, Judge Diana Murphy offers strong grounds
for reversal. She finds that the court "unnecessarily reaches a constitutional issue and bases its
conclusions on speculation rather than the record," noting further that the decision "strays far from the
existing path of nondelegation doctrine.? 69 F.3d at 85-86 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Indeed, other
circuits have not expressed such concern with the breadth of the Secretary's power. See, e.g., Florida
Dept. of Bus. Reg. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 768 F.2d 1248, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986).
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taxes, land-use, and simple economic competition (all of which may be
seriously affected by the decision to place land in trust for a Native American
nation), among others, are straining the ties between Native Americans and
their neighbors.
Trust lands-property held by the federal government for the use of Native
Americans-are at the center of the problem. One of the most fundamental
elements of Native American-federal government relations has been the
"trust" relationship that makes the federal government's authority with respect
to Native American issues, including property rights and use, essentially
exclusive.' 59 Once land is taken into trust for a Native American tribe, the
land itself and activities on it are subject only to federal regulation. Further,
land taken into trust is "exempt from State and local taxation."'" While this
arrangement occasionally drew criticism in the past, the limited activity on trust
lands was innocuous enough to avoid serious conflict. However, as the federal
government has accepted more land into trust and profitable activities on trust
lands have increased, all levels of government and the tribes themselves have
focused renewed attention on the legal scheme that governs trust land.
Relations between American government institutions and Native American
nations are more prominent today than they have been in decades. Primarily
due to the growth of Native American-operated gaming facilities and the wealth
they generate, the impact of Native Americans on the operations of states and
municipalities has grown enormously. In large part, the growth of conflict and
negotiation has arisen out of the increased physical juxtaposition of the
communities and the more interdependent fiscal relationships between the
communities. In turn, these contacts and evolving relationships have invigorat-
ed a complex and often anachronistic set of legal and policy issues. This is the
context for South Dakota.
This essay describes the process by which land is placed in trust and the
general controversy surrounding trust land. It proceeds to enumerate the
positions of the major players-Native Americans, the federal government,
states, and municipalities-with respect to two principle policy arenas:
economic impact and regulatory authority. Notably, these subjects are
characterized by shifting alliances and countervailing policy incentives.
This complexity is partially driven by confusion and misunderstanding. It
is important to realize that while the issues in conflict are genuine, the strength
of feeling on the part of the participants, especially local governments, is
enhanced by two critical misperceptions: first, that Native American landhold-
ings are increasing thanks to the trust process; and second, that Native
159. On the origins of the trust doctrine, see, e.g., Note, Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal
Indian Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 422 (1984).
160. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1994).
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American nations are flourishing economically. Both conceptions are
inaccurate. Despite the trust process, a number of tribes have seen a net loss
of land during the past six decades.' While gaming has dramatically
improved the fortunes of a tiny minority of Native Americans, the vast
majority remain impoverished and seek to use the trust process to initiate or
continue modest developmental projects.
Nevertheless, as increased attention is focused on Native American
economic development, state and local governments find themselves in a
situation in which local tax burdens for non-Indians are likely to increase (or
tax revenues decline) while local regulatory schemes will either be frustrated
or brought into line with the less-stringent (or nonexistent) federal regulation
in force on trust land. Usually, these effects are a necessary price for fulfilling
the nation's commitment to assisting Native Americans. Increasingly, however,
state and local governments feel threatened. The reality of the situation
suggests that although their concerns are legitimate and should not be
disregarded, the problems raised may be minimized through good-faith
negotiation. The problems for states that remain represent an acceptable
sacrifice to the interest of long-term Native American development.
A. Creating Trusts
Trust land is governed by the Indian Reorganization Act, originally passed
in 1934. Section 465 authorizes the Secretary of the Interior
in his discretion, to acquire, through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or
assignment, any interest in lands, water rights, or surface rights to land, within or
without existing reservations, including trust or otherwise restricted allotments,
whether the allottee be living or deceased, for the purpose of providing land for
Indians.'6
Currently, section 465 limits appropriations for such purposes to $2 million per
year. The land is owned by the federal government, in perpetuity, and both the
tribe and the government must agree to any future sale." Today, the federal
161. "[A]s to sixteen tribes with reservations in Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota...
the Bureau of Indian Affairs Aberdeen Area reports that during the 10-year period from 1985 to the
present a total of 18,120 acres of land were taken into trust while 46,399 acres passed from trust to fee
status." Brief for Amici for rehearing en bane at 2 n.1, South Dakota and City of Oacoma v. Dept. of
Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995) (No. 94-2344); see also Remarks of Sen. Daschle, 141 CONG.
REC. S3967 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1995) ("Far more Indian land is converted from trust status to fee
status. During the past 5 years, less than 1,000 acres have been converted to trust status in South
Dakota.").
162. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1994).
163. Jon Frandsen, Why Indians Want Government to Take Land Into Trust, Gannett News Service,
Sept. 28, 1995, available in WESTLAW, GANNETNS file.
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government holds 3.6 million square miles in trust for Native Americans. 64
There are two ways to put land into trust. The tribe may ask the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) to take land into trust, in which case the Bureau has
discretion to approve or deny the request. Alternatively, the tribes can ask
Congress to order the BIA to place land in trust."e The process is character-
ized less by straightforward application of rules than by complex, fact-specific
negotiation between the various affected parties. 1" While Native American
groups tend to have the advantage in these negotiations-because they are not
technically required by section 465 to reach agreements with local govern-
ments-the balance may shift if state and local governments succeed in
persuading Congress or the Department of the Interior to reform the trust land
process to improve their bargaining position. Such a shift may be unnecessary
though if the decision in South Dakota withstands review.
South Dakota and City of Oacoma v. United States Department of the
Interior began as a thoroughly normal trust acquisition case.167 The Lower
Brmle Tribe of Sioux Indians requested that the Secretary of the Interior
purchase and place into trust, pursuant to section 465, ninety-one acres of land,
seven miles away from their reservation and partially within the city of
Oacoma, South Dakota.1 61 The Tribe claimed that "the land would be used
to create an industrial park adjacent to an interstate highway," 169  and
maintained that "'[t]his site, Trust status for the land, and tax advantages are
critically necessary for the [industrial park] development to occur.'' 7 The
City of Oacoma unsuccessfully sought to persuade the BIA not to approve the
acquisition and the federal government took title in November 1992. In their
164. Bill McAllister, BIA Plans to Cut At Least 2,600 From Work Force, WAsH. POST, Sept. 7,
1995, at Al.
165. Frandsen, supra note 163.
166. The Bureau's decision, however, is guided by 25 C.F.R. § 151.10. That section sets out eight
factors which the Secretary must consider when evaluating an application to put land into trust,
including: the need of the individual or tribe; "the purposes for which the land will be used[;]...
D]urisdictiona problems and potential conflicts of land use[;] ... [and, i]f the land to be put in trust
is in unrestricted fee status, the impact on the State and its political subdivisions resulting from the
removal of the land from the tax rolls." 25 C.F.R. § 151.10 (1995). However, while "[p]Mroof that these
factors were considered must appear in the administrative record," City of Eagle Butte, South Dakota
v. Aberdeen Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 96 Interior Dec. 328, 331 (1989), the
considerations are not "limits on the Secretary's authority to acquire land for the benefit of Indians."
Florida Dept. of Bus. Reg. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 768 F.2d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986).
They do not purport to state for what Indian Tribe the Secretary may acquire land, or how much
land may be acquired, or even the circumstances under which the Secretary may use his authority.
Rather, they are more precisely labeled as factors to be considered in exercising discretion. As such,
they do not constrain the Secretary's authority to acquire land in trust for Indians.
Id.
167. Which is to say that it was characterized by a high degree of disagreement, confusion, and
misunderstanding.
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subsequent suit, Oacoma and the state of South Dakota claimed that the
acquisition "deprives them of tax revenues and may place the land beyond their
regulatory powers."17 Among their many alternative pleadings, the City and
State also alleged that the Tribe was not planning to develop an industrial park
at all but rather intended to build a casino-a plan of which the Department of
Interior was alleged to have knowledge.'72 Thus, South Dakota began with
standard concerns of economic impact and reduction of sovereignty, tinged
with suspicion and mistrust, not only between governments and Native
Americans but between different levels of government as well.
B. Economic Impact
The plaintiffs in South Dakota were correct to point to the loss of tax
revenue. In any Indian trust arrangement, state and local governments face
potential reductions of property, sales and income tax revenue (and the
prospect of tax rate hikes to compensate for the smaller base). From the Native
American standpoint, of course, the absence of a federal property tax makes
trust status very desirable. Meanwhile, as localities fear tax losses, the federal
government-already seen by state and local governments as opposed to their
interests in trust controversies-is the only governmental entity with the
potential to reach Indian revenues directly.173 Consequently, Washington
suffers no noticeable loss of revenue as a result of placing land in trust and the
Department of Interior's mandate to provide land for Indians places the
Department on the side of Native Americans in these disputes. Nevertheless,
tax revenues are only part of the financial equation and the economic activities
on trust land (or related to its development) can affect, both positively and
negatively, the local economy. Ultimately, the economic concerns of state and
local governments are real, but where gambling is not at issue, they are also
frequently overstated.
Faced with the removal of potentially sizable tracts of land from their tax
rolls, municipalities are understandably concerned. Many localities rely on
property taxes as their principle source of revenue, especially for services
171. Id. This, of course, is true whenever land is placed into trust for Native Americans, so the
challenge brought by the city effectively struck at all trust lands.
172. Id. Apparently the city feared the impact of a gaming industry more than other potential forms
of development, or, at the very least, felt that the presence of gaming was a sufficiently important
question that it should be publicly debated.
173. A federal corporate income tax, applied only to income derived from gaming, was proposed
this year and made some progress in the House of Representatives. The proposal would have diverted
up to thirty-five percent of gaming revenue from Indian tribes to the federal government. Should a
federal tax on gaming income pass, however, tribes will either find themselves essentially double-taxed
or will have to negotiate their way out of agreements with state governments for donations in lieu of
taxes, a task that would surely not be easy. See Taxing the Tribes, Editorial, WASH. TIMEs, Nov. 7,
1995, at A18. Even if no such tax passes, state and local governments clearly do not see the federal
government's position toward their tax problem as friendly. For a more complete discussion of the
proposed tax, see supra Part I.
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whose costs are not highly elastic, such as public education. Consequently,
local governments are generally compelled to raise the property tax rate on the
remaining taxable property.
Communities may be more sensitive to property tax increases than to many
other types of local taxes or to state and federal taxes, as well as more aware
of different rates in neighboring municipalities, because of citizen proximity to
the decision-making and the centrality of property taxes to municipal finances.
Consequently, local residents may be the most vocal opponents to expanding
a Native American presence in their communities. 74
Trust land is also exempt from state and local sales tax for which, once
again, there is no federal counterpart. Until recently, local governments had
complained about little more than sales of cigarettes and the like on Indian
land. However, as Native American economic development steadily increases
(especially in the area of gaming), municipalities may be caught in an awkward
situation of tax competition. As transactions on trust land supplant taxable
transactions off trust land, sales tax revenue will decline. While there is some
risk that increases in property tax rates will encourage people to move, there
seems to be an even greater risk that increases in the sales tax rate could drive
even more transactions onto non-taxable territory. It is a competition,
therefore, in which municipalities are structurally disadvantaged.
Despite the apparent decline in state and local tax revenues, however, the
effects caused by Native American trust land may not be so dire for state and
local governments' cash flows as may first appear. Native American groups,
for example, are hardly the only landowners that escape property taxes;
government buildings, churches, and universities all diminish the tax base. 75
All levels of government may also benefit by a reduction in welfare service
costs as Native American tribes become increasingly economically success-
ful. 76 Further, as a general rule, the tribes will negotiate payment agree-
174. Local newspapers frequently alert readers to differences in regional tax rates. For an
exemplary account of small-town tax comparisons, see Hold that Line: 47 of 60 Areas Freezing Local
Taxes This Year, LANCASTER NEW ERA (PA), Jan. 14, 1993, at BI (describing reasons for alterations
in mill rates of townships of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania).
175. A number of types of federally administered lands are also tax-exempt, including those
administered by the Bureau of Land Management, the National Park Service and the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service. Notably, federal law provides for a program known as "payments in lieu of taxes" or
PILT, 31 U.S.C. §§ 6901-07 (1994), under which States receive nominal compensation for lost tax
revenues on applicable federally managed lands. In 1995, Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD) introduced
legislation to amend section 6901 to include Indian trust land in the compensation program. S. Res. 560,
104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REc. 53967 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1995). The bill would, at the very
least, demonstrate some concern on the part of the federal government for state and municipal tax issues,
but no action has been taken on the bill.
176. In Wisconsin, for example, the Department of Health and Social Services reported a 26.9%
reduction in the number of people receiving AFDC, between January 1991 and December 1993, in
"rural counties with Indian casinos compared with a reduction of just 4 percent in the rest of the state"
over the same period. Dale D. Buss, House Wins: Native American Communities Across the State are
Raking in the Chips; Usually, Everybody Wins, but Sometimes Local Businesses Lose, CORP. REP. WIS.
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ments for provision of local services such as fire and water,177 and they may
often agree to make voluntary payments in lieu of taxes.178
Sometimes payments result in political concessions. In Connecticut, for
example, the Mashantucket Pequots are the largest single contributor to the
state treasury, donating twenty-five percent of their gross slot machine revenue,
in exchange for their slot machine monopoly. 179 On the local level, when the
Pequots proposed expanding their holdings by 267 acres, they offered "$1
million apiece each year for five years" to three neighboring towns if they
dropped their opposition to the purchase."t
Furthermore, agreements do not always provide the stability of a tax, as the
village government of Turtle Lake, Wisconsin discovered. There, the St. Croix
Chippewa Tribe ceased paying $12,500 per month in lieu of taxes after the
village asked if the tribe intended to place $3.5 million worth of village land
off the tax rolls and into trust in order to build a hotel.' In Oklahoma, the
city of Lawton delayed running utility lines to an 85-year-old Kiowa Indian's
residential lot for fear that he or his heirs would one day open a business on
the property if the town did not get a prior agreement in writing."
Direct taxes, of course, are only part of the financial equation for state and
local governments. Stimulated business activity resulting from Native American
development projects can, occasionally, partially compensate for the loss of tax
revenue. However, it is unclear whether Native American commercial activity
will stimulate or compete with local businesses. Most likely it will do both; the
ultimate outcome will be very difficult to predict, as the effects may change
over time. In any event, the negotiations sought by state and local governments
often may alleviate the impact of this uncertainty.
Apr. 1995, at 20.
177. See, e.g., Indian Gaming Profits Put Neighborly Relations at Risk, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Oct. 8, 1995, at E2.
178. A typical agreement is that reached by the Catawba Tribe of South Carolina with three county
governments in 1993. With respect to taxes, the parties agreed that,
The tribe, the tribal trust funds, and tribally owned enterprises will be non-taxable for federal
income tax purposes like other federal tribes, and its income will be non-taxable by the state for 99
years. Federal trust lands will be exempt from real property taxes, and improvements on the land
will be exempt from real property taxes for 99 years. The tribe will make substitute payments to
support its children in the public schools. The state will not tax sales occurring on the reservation,
but the tribe agrees to impose and collect a sales tax equal to the state's sales tax.
Summary of the Catawba Indian Land-Claim Settlement, HERALD (Rock Hill, SC), Jan. 26, 1993, at
8A (relying on information compiled by Native American Rights Fund). The agreement also provided
for environmental and zoning regulations, among other things.
179. Patrick Lakamp, 7me's Running Out: Native Casinos Threatened with Taxes, Regulation,
POSr-STANDARD (Syracuse, NY), Oct. 13, 1995, at A8.
180. Elizabeth Ross, ConnecticutTowns See TribalExpansion Plan as Too HighRollin', CHRISrIAN
Sci. MONITOR, Aug. 24, 1993, at A7.
181. Buss, supra note 176, at 22. The St. Croix halted plans to build the hotel.
182. Lawton Denies Utilities to Kiowa, BIA Claims, TuLSA TRiB., Sept. 21, 1992, at 5A.
Apparently, Lawton previously experienced trouble with water payment agreements breached by the
Kiowa-Comanche-Apache intertribal land-use committee. Id.
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Wisconsin offers an excellent example of the diverse economic effect of
Native American development. In the spring of 1995, Corporate Report
Wisconsin compared the effects of Native American gaming on two Wisconsin
communities-Wisconsin Dells and Turtle Lake-over the previous three
years1 ' Citing preliminary research by a University of Wisconsin professor,
the Report noted that in the Dells "52 percent of the 82 non-gaming businesses
... surveyed have experienced an increase in summer visitor volume since the
casino's opening-and nearly 43 percent have gotten a boost during the off
season."' The Turtle Lake business community experienced a similar boom
but has had more notable setbacks. One entrepreneur opened a large restaurant
across the street from the casino that was successful until the casino expanded
its own food-service facilities to keep more people in-house."
While the size and scope of the business effect is much larger when linked
to gaming, such effects are not unique to casinos. In Turtle Lake, the Oneida
tribe has expanded into a diverse range of technology, service, and manufactur-
ing industries. 8 6 Although the Oneida development clearly has been funded
by casino money, even tribes that do not develop through gaming will slowly
create more and more competition and opportunities for local businesses.
Where trust land status leaves Native Americans in a privileged economic
position, competition is likely to outweigh the opportunities for mutual benefit.
In locations where development is not connected to gaming the economic issues
are not so pressing. Where development is focused on gaming, however, the
economic opportunities will often seem at least equal to potential negative
impact. Regulatory authority over trust land, therefore, is of more immediate
and significant concern to state and local governments.
C. Regulatory Authority
Once land is placed in trust, Native American tribes begin to reap the
economic benefits of a reduced regulatory burden while averting the political
wrangling normally associated with local regulatory regimes. Cost savings
associated with minimal regulatory burdens and freedom from such things as
zoning restrictions make trust land the equivalent of an economic development
zone. In some sense, that is exactly the point of trust status-the problems
encountered by state and local governments are not merely incidental, but
anticipated, if not intended, by the section 465 scheme. Indeed, tribes may
often look to purchase land "located within urban growth boundaries."'
The municipalities, then, are not only faced with the confounding of their
183. Buss, supra note 176, at 20.
184. Id. at 21
185. Id. at 22.
186. Id. at 21.
187. Indian Gaming Profits Put Neighborly Relations at Risk, supra note 177.
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regulatory scheme but also a perceived affront to their sovereignty.
The regulatory gap, like the taxation gap, can be filled with negotiations.
However, state and local governments are dependent on federal assistance to
negotiate successfully. Once the land is placed in trust, the tribe's incentive to
negotiate is reduced (except to the extent that municipalities can withhold
services pending payment agreements or regulatory assurances). Consequently,
state and municipal governments often ask the Department of Interior to reject
trust applications, or at least to delay the process until state and local
negotiations have settled the contours of potential regulatory problems. The
federal government has the final say: it has the statutory authority to give
Native Americans nearly everything they need or to withhold such benefits
until local government concerns are fully met. Although both sides seek to
enlist Washington's aid, negotiated settlements remain the norm and both sides
surely realize that a neighborly relationship is in their best interest.
Nevertheless, reaching agreement on regulation is particularly difficult.
Normally, the political process can accommodate changing regulatory needs
over time, but negotiated compacts may be more rigid, thus requiring precisely
the sort of long-range planning that municipalities may not be in a position to
evaluate at the time of initial negotiation. It is not surprising, in this context,
that the plaintiffs in South Dakota were especially anxious to know, before the
trust was created, the purposes to which the tribe proposed to put the land.
The difficulties of settling regulatory differences were recently demonstrat-
ed in Oregon. The Siletz tribe there is seeking to put land into trust that it
recently purchased inside Lincoln City. 8' Although the Siletz agreed to
compensate the city for lost taxes and services, they offered only non-binding
assurances to "adopt zoning regulations and building codes that will meet or
exceed local regulations.""8 9 According to Lincoln City's attorney, "[t]he
implications of this for the state and local governments-a patchwork of places
within urban areas that are not subject to any of their regulatory sovereignty,
but instead subject to independent tribal sovereignty-are enormous. " 19
When these conflicts arise and if regulatory discrepancies persist, local and
state governments will either have to live with those differences, including
detrimental competition to non-Indian businesses, or bring their regulations into
line with federal law. Either way, local preferences will be frustrated. The
more successful Native American enterprises become, the more pressure there
will be to provide locals with a comparable, "competitive" regulatory regime.
Regardless of local preferences, state and municipal governments will feel
compelled to match the federal regulatory scheme, at least in areas adjacent to
188. See Roberta Ulrich, Tribe's Reach for Thst Land Antagonizes Lincoln City, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Sept. 25, 1995, at B1.
189. Indian Gaming Profits Put Neighborly Relations At Risk, supra note 177.
190. Id.
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trust land, in order to remain "competitive." The federal structure of the land
trust program, therefore, may create a local race to the bottom. Aside from
raising questions about the merits of regulation, this conflict raises serious
federalism issues for localities which may find their valuation of local resources
and regulatory needs incidentally displaced by pockets of federally regulated
land in their midst. 91
At this point, such regulatory conflict is only hypothetical. The rapid
expansion of Native American land-holdings, especially in the wake of gaming
investment, is still fairly new. So far, municipalities, states, and Native
American tribes have usually been able to reach satisfactory agreements.
However, disagreements have been on the rise and, as demonstrated by the
decision in South Dakota, state and local government advocates are finding
significant sympathy for their concerns.
D. Conclusion
The concerns of state and local governments are genuine. However, they
are also somewhat exaggerated. Most of the concerns focus on Indian gaming.
In locations where gaming is not driving the expansion, those governments
have no major cause for fear. The slower pace of development in such
situations should allow for the accommodation of competing interests as parties
adjust to changing circumstances. Trust land can provide exactly the sort of
development-friendly environment needed for a tribe to pursue economic
development efforts.
.Nonetheless, gaming is visible and is energizing efforts to "reform"
regulation of Native Americans. Indian gaming has created a popular
impression of Native American nations as economically vibrant; with a few
exceptions, such as the Pequots (who number only 300), this is not the case.
As a group, Native Americans remain impoverished and their primary access
to development comes through trust land. According to Assistant Interior
Secretary Ada Deer, only twenty of the more than 500 federally recognized
tribes are "'doing fairly well,'" with gaming operations supporting only one
percent of Native Americans. 192
The proper balance between government and Native Americans in this
emerging area of conflict is uncertain and likely to be dependent on local
circumstances. Both sides have concerns about sovereignty, beyond simple
economic and regulatory competition, which may make each side more
determined. What is clear is that if changes in the current arrangement are to
191. This frustration is symbolized by the broad attack made by the plaintiffs in South Dakota.
Their substantive claims, if accepted, are sufficient to defeat not only the case at hand, but the entire
scheme of trust land management.
192. McAllister, supra note 164.
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be made, it is the federal government's prerogative to do so. So far,
Washington has been content to encourage ad hoc compacts between Native
Americans and state and local governments. These governments do not seem
particularly satisfied with this arrangement and continue to press for reform.
The Portland Oregonian summarized the desires of many state and local
governments by asking the BIA to "ask the tribes and all governments affected
by an Indian land-trust application to resolve their differences through
negotiation before it gives [its] approval. " 193 The federal government may
have to move in that direction.
Last year, Congress reformed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of
1989,191 responding to State pressure to grant them greater authority to
regulate Native American gaming. Section 465 may be next. On June 21,
1995, Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) introduced the "Indian Trust Lands
Reform Act of 1995."1 95 The Senator's bill seeks to differentiate between
economically successful tribes, particularly those involved in gambling, whose
further trust acquisitions are merely new investments and those tribes still
struggling to get on their feet economically. The bill "would prohibit the
Secretary of Interior from taking any lands located outside of the boundaries
of an Indian reservation in trust on behalf of an economically self-sufficient
Indian tribe, if those lands are to be used for gaming or any other commercial
purpose."19 The proposal thus adds a new consideration, tribal self-
sufficiency, to the process of reviewing trust land requests. The Secretary of
Interior would have to promulgate regulations in accordance with procedures
of the Administrative Procedure Act1  "to prescribe the criteria that shall be
used to determine the economic self-sufficiency of an Indian tribe . . .";19
the bill requires that those regulations must include assessment of the income
of the tribe and "the role that the lands at issue will play in the tribe's efforts
to achieve economic self-sufficiency."199 Senator Lieberman's proposal may
be a sensible initiation of a needed review of the trust land system. While the
concerns of state and local governments are not always substantial, they are
genuine, and in situations where gambling is an important factor the tensions
over trust land are growing steadily.
Nevertheless, the Senate has not yet acted on Senator Lieberman's
proposal. The South Dakota decision invalidating section 465, even if reversed,
193. Indian Gaming Profits Put Neighborly Relations at Risk, supra note 177.
194. See Sovereignty Issues in the Regulation of Indian Gaming, supra Part I; see also Edward P.
Sullivan, Note, Reshuffling the Deck: Proposed Amendments to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 45
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1107 (1995).
195. S.952, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see also Sen. Lieberman's introductory remarks on the
bill, 141 CONG. REc. S.8822 (daily ed. June 27, 1995).
196. Remarks of Sen. Lieberman, id. at S.8823.
197. 5 U.S.C. §553 (1994).
198. S.952, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
199. Remarks of Sen. Lieberman, 141 CONG. REC. S.8822.
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may be a sufficient inducement for congressional action.' As the federal
government begins to consider Native American regulatory issues in earnest,
it will need to keep a number of concerns in mind, not the least of which is the
historical commitment to preserve and advance Native American interests.
While gaming success has often generated vocal responses from affected
non-Indian communities, Congress and the Department of the Interior should
not forget that gaming is not an issue for the vast number of Native Americans
whose interests they guard. Attention to gaming controversies should not lead
to ill-considered reform of the entire Native American development scheme of
which trust land has become a necessary part.
- Julian Schreibman
200. The decision in South Dakota demonstrates a surprising willingness to skip over administrative
reforms such as those proposed by Sen. Lieberman. The parties in South Dakota appear to have
expected the case to focus on issues of administrative law. Judge Murphy noted that the appeal had
originally centered on the reviewability of the Department's decisions under elements of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994). South Dakota, 69 F.3d at 885 (Murphy,
J., dissenting) ("Rather than addressing the jurisdictional issue, the majority stretches to consider the
constitutionality of the underlying statute.... Resolution of the constitutional question would not be
required if the merits of the APA claims were to be determined in favor of the plaintiffs.").
Vol. 14:353, 1996
